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EDiTOR.
A very wise judge once said that no trial lawyer
needs to be told how to make a summation because
within the inner recesses of his heart every advo-
cate earnestly feels that he is the lineal descendant
of Demosthenes with a little kinship to both
William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow
thrown in for size. For this reason it is difficult to
say anything about the subject which would be of
interest to prosecutors. There are, however, a few
fundamentals which might be considered.
With rare exceptions, oratory is not nearly as
effective for a prosecutor as a clear, direct and
logical discussion of the case-in effect, talking it
over with the jurors, utilizing the type of argument
that can be followed easily and which will lead to
reasonable conclusions. Certainly it is not to be
understood that the address to the jury should be
a dull, unemotional discourse. If the case is one
which calls for an appeal to the feelings and emo-
tions, the prosecutor will quite naturally become
oratorical at times; and as the natural and spon-
taneous product of the subject matter, this can be
most effective. Such outbursts, however, should
never be overdone either as to length, frequency,
or number. Today, flamboyance is largely a thing
of the past. Instead, the emphasis is on naturalism
-being yourself. The greatest tool and technique
of a prosecutor is to create from the very beginning
of the trial an atmosphere of sincerity, earnestness,
and confidence in the righteousness of the cause.
If you do this, and then in argument follow through
in simple, forceful terms, you have mastered ninety
per cent of the problem.
PkEPARATION
One of the first things to be considered in argu-
ment is preparation. It is indispensable to good
argument that it be well-founded, logical, reason-
able, and sufficiently interesting to hold the atten-
tion of the jurors. There are a few geniuses in our
profession who can do this on the spur of the
moment, but they are exceedingly rare. For most of
us, the best technique is to make an outline of the
argument before the trial begins, and then as the
trial progresses it can be supplemented and revised
so that just before actual presentation of your
argument an orderly and effective arrangement of
these points can be made quickly. This practice
not only prevents the omission of a point but also
encourages more concise, logical, and interesting
presentation. It is the duty of the prosecutor in
his summation to fit all the pieces of evidence to-
gether so that they form a comprehensive and
comprehensible picture for the jury. This can not
be done effectively without preparation from the
beginning of the trial.
MANLEY J. BOWLER
WAIVER
What about waiving argument? It is inadvisable
for a prosecutor ever to waive argument, even
though a proper verdict seems inevitable and a
foregone conclusion. Jurors view the argument as
a necessary part of the trial and expect that each
advocate will put up a fight to secure a verdict in
his favor. If the prosecutor fails to make an argu-
ment, they wonder why. It is certain that one or
more of the jurors are likely to interpret the omis-
sion as evidencing a lack of confidence in the cause;
or, if they have confidence in the ability and in-
tegrity of the prosecutor, they might conclude
that by reason of something within his own knowl-
edge and not brought out at the trial, he is not
satisfied that justice requires a verdict in his favor.
Where the cause of counsel is so dear that
argument seems unnecessary, the argument may be
brief. It may include the statement that the case
is so clear that argument is unnecessary, or even an
apology for arguing so obvious a cause. But since
we never know how all twelve jurors will take it,
the argument should not be waived.
CONTENT
Generally, what should be the content of the
prosecutor's opening and dosing argument? The
answer to this question depends largely upon the
facts of the case. Some months ago our office was
trying L. Ewing Scott for murder. As you may re-
call, in that case we had no body, or any part of a
body, and no admission or confession.' However,
we had an insurmountable collection of circum-
stantial evidence. At that time a story about a
comparable case, in which Mrs. "X" disappeared
and her husband was charged with her murder,
came to our attention. In his opening argument the
district attorney spent the whole day reviewing in
detail one incriminating circumstance after
another, establishing beyond any reasonable
doubt that Mrs. "X" was dead and the defendant
was responsible. Defense counsel then rose and
informed the jury he would be very brief because
be was going to demonstrate to them that there
was a lingering doubt in the minds of each and
every one of them that Mrs. X" was actually
I See California v. Scott, 176 Cal. App. 2d 458,
1 Cal. Reptr. 600 (1959), cert. denied, 81 S. Ct. 245
(1960).
dead. With that he hesitated a moment, then as
the door of the courtroom swung open, he said,
"Why, there is Mrs. X' now-coming through the
door." At that moment every head and eye in the
jury box turned in unison toward the door of the
courtroom. Defense counsel sat down With the
word that the jury by its action had demonstrated
its doubt as to the actual death of Mrs. "X". The
prosecutor arose and acknowledged the success of
defense counsel's little experiment and that it was
true that when defense counsel said, "Why, there
is Mrs. 'X'," everyone in the courtroom turned to
look except one significant person, and that was
the defendant himself. His eyes and head remained
stationary as a sphinx because he, and he alone,
knew with certainty that Mrs. "X" would never
be coming through that courtroom door.
Generally, the prosecutor having the first argu-
ment must consider the possibility that at this
point of the trial the jurors may not all be in favor
of his cause. To some extent at least, the case of his
adversary has made an impression upon them,
especially since the defendant's evidence is still
ringing in their ears. Therefore, he should not only
present his case and its strong points, but should
go farther and point out the weaknesses and lack
of merits in the defendant's case, reconcile the
conflict if the evidence is unfavorable, and
eliminate whatever favorable impressions the de-
fendant's case has made upon the minds of the
jurors.
When it comes time to reply to defense counsel's
argument, the prosecutor must be careful not to
assume that his opponent's argument, which to
him seems weak, illogical, and unreasonable, will
be viewed by the jurors in the same light. Every
seasoned trial lawyer is fully aware of the fact that
such an argument directly will cause the jurors to
develop doubt, be swayed, or even be influenced
into returning a verdict. The only safe course to
follow is, if possible, to destroy and remove its
effect, even though it may seem to be unworthy of
comment because of its obviously weak and illogi-
cal character. Unless this is done, there is always
the likelihood that one or more of the jurors may
accept such an argument; and should such a juror
mention it during the deliberations in the jury
room, it is well to have the prosecutor's argument
to overcome and meet the point. If you have failed
to furnish the required ammunition to blast the
fallacious argument, it might prevail.
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COmmNICATiON OF THE LAW AND
EVIDENCE TO THE JURY
Some of the most vexing problems facing a prose-
cutor in argument to the jury are the everyday
ones. If he tries to research these questions, he is
likely to find that they have been generally
neglected by the writers and authorities in the
legal field. We might well consider some of these.
ARGUING LAW
One thing prosecutors face each day is the prob-
lem of arguing law to a jury. Perhaps the greatest
fiction known to the law today is that jurors grasp
and understand the court's instructions on princi-
ples of law which lawyers and judges have taken
many years to learn- -and, in many instances, have
never fully comprehended. In Los Angeles County,
Judge Frank Swain of the Superior Court likes to
write poetry. In his book, Judicial Jingles, he
parodied this situation as follows:
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury:
"The time now arrives
To brighten your lives
By reading unending instructions;
Though it is a fiction
That you heed my diction
When making juristic deductions.
"If you can agree
After these words from me,
I shall be surprised and delighted.
It's gambling, I know,
Like win, place, or show,
But for that you can't be indicted."
Unfortunately, the form of present day criminal
jury instructions is not a laughing matter. It is an
indictment of all members of the legal profession
in their failure to fulfill the most basic attribute of
advocacy, that of communication.
If the technical medical testimony of an expert
witness is not communicated to the jury in simple,
understandable terms, we could say with certainty
that the advocate who called him as a witness was
a failure. But an even greater failure is that of
several generations of lawyers and judges who have
been unable to draft instructions which will pre-
sent legal theory in plain terms which appeal to
common understanding. This failure on the part
of the entire profession has imposed upon the in-
dividual advocate the burden of translating legal
theory into common sense by his argument to the
jury. If this is not done effectively, the individual
advocate is not doing his job.
In California, counsel in criminal cases are ma-
terially assisted by a recent addition to our Penal
Code (Section 1093.5) requiring that before com-
mencement of argument the trial judge must de-
cide upon the instructions he is going to give. It is
apparent that the California Legislature, by en-
acting this provision, impliedly recognized the
propriety of reference to law in argument. Refer-
ence to applicable law is indispensable in arguing
the merits of a lawsuit and accurate statements of
law are always permissible. It is generally held
that the boundaries of such argument are within
the discretion of the trial judge.
METHODS USED 10 PRESENT THE LAW
The presentation of law to the jury, like most
matters of trial tactics, is a matter of individual
ingenuity and preference. There are, however,
three methods which may be used in various com-
binations: Illustration, historical analysis, and
repetition.
(1) Illustraimon
Illustration is probably the only effective means
to communicate with jurors concerning those words
which have a peculiar legal meaning. There is
probably not one juror out of one hundred who
knows that malice aforethought and premedita-
tion are two different things. Illustration is always
effective in making those subtle distinctions which
laymen too often regard as legalistic "mumbo-
jumbo."
Jurors frequently have their own ideas about
legal theories. A good example is the right of self
defense. In such matters, of course, we are always
dealing with the reasonable man standard. It is
effective to give examples of what the defendant
as a reasonable man should have done. This may
serve the dual purpose of clarifying the law to the
juror and also removing any preconceived ideas
he may have about the rights of a person in de-
fense of himself.
This type of argument may be demonstrated by
reference to a murder case tried in Los Angeles. It
was given national publicity because it had aspects
of a gangland killing and Mickey Cohen was
prominently mentioned. In a bistro located in our
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famous San Fernando Valley, Sam LoCigno shot
and killed Jack O'Hara. LoCigno relied on self
defense. It was successfully pointed out to the
jury that the defendant's actions were not reason-
able. O'Hara was a big fellow who had a bad repu-
tation of using brute force in his role as an en-
forcer, but he was never known to carry a gun.
O'Hara came to the restaurant to talk about a
gambling debt. He approached the table occupied
by Cohen, LoCigno, and four or five others, in-
cluding two beautiful women. He stood at the
table opposite LoCigno and held a brief conversa-
tion with one of the other men seated at the table.
During this conversation, O'Hara slapped the
man, and then made a remark to LoCigno, "You're
next, you Dago -. " With that, LoCigno im-
mediately shot O'Hara through the head with a
.38 bullet. The gun he used was never recovered.
It was pointed out to the jury that there was no
indication that O'Hara was armed or that LoCigno
had any reason to believe he was. The cafe was full
of other patrons, including many of the defendant's
mobster friends. Under the circumstances, LoCigno
could have fired a warning shot or at least have
shouted a warning before firing; he did not do so.
Instead, he fled the scene immediately and went
into hiding for several days.
In short, this method of illustration of what a
reasonable man should do under the circumstances
gives the prosecutor an opportunity not only to
to clarify the law of self defense, but also- to
graphically bring home to a juror who might be
faltering examples of what the defendant should
have done. This will help to restore the juror to
proper perspective.
(2) Historical analysis
When the subject matter is legally relevant, but
lacks the moral or logical significance that it had
in an earlier age, historical analysis may be of
real benefit. Two examples may serve to -illustrate
this situation: where entrapment is claimed, and
where evidence of good reputation is offered by a
defendant.
We all know that if the jury in its deliberations
finds itself confused as to the law, it may feel its
confusion to be a reasonable doubt. It therefore is
essential that these matters be put into proper
perspective at the time of argument. A prosecutor
may affirm his complete belief in the defense of
entrapment and the jury's duty to follow the law.
At the same time, he may minimize any undue or
improper effect of the defense by describing its
origin in the efforts of the court to protect the
citizenry against the nefarious practice which pre-
vailed when law was enforced by thief-takers or
legal bounty hunters who made their living by ob-
taining convictions instead of securing justice. The
jury will then understand that this ancient law does
not indicate that the judiciary believes such out-
rages as entrapment are likely to be committed by
a salaried professional police officer who has sworn
to uphold the law. He has nothing to gain from a
conviction; instead he has his conscience to live
with.
The effect of reputation evidence may also be
placed in perspective by pointing out its ancient
origin, its validity in small medieval communities
its irrelevance to an age of larger cities and rapid
transportation.
(3) Repetition
Unless a rule of law is firmly fixed in the minds
of the jury by repetition, they will make unau-
thorized variations upon it. For example, a prose-
cutor should not overlook the value of reiterating
that there are no exceptions to a given rule of law
and stressing the jury's duty to follow the law as it
is, making no exceptions of their own. By the same
token, it should be emphasized that a verdict con-
trary to law is a disgrace and an eternal burden
upon the juror's conscience.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Another matter prosecutors face each day is
arguing expert testimony to a jury. The argument
of expert testimony, both with reference to one's
own experts and the discussion of those called by
the defense, is of considerable importance. Yet, we
frequently see it done with varying degrees of in-
adequacy. Almost always the fault can be traced
directly to a confused presentation of the testi-
mony of the prosecution's experts during the trial.
These defects occur because of inadequate under-
standing by counsel of the subject matter to which
the experts have addressed themselves. Therefore,
the first step toward effective use of expert testi-
mony as evidence, and in argument, is a reasonable
grasp of the subject by counsel himself.
It is hard to conceive how a jury could under-
stand the testimony of an expert and be persuaded
to base a finding upon it, unless the attorney has
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at least the same understanding which he expects
the jury to have achieved after hearing the testi-
mony and his argument. On the other hand, coun-
sel does not need a Ph.D. in each branch of science
in which he seeks to enlighten the jury. It is told
oi Fallon, the renowned trial lawyer, that at the
conclusion of a brilliant cross examination of the
head of Harvard's gynecology department, the
distinguished expert asked Fallon, "May I ask
you a question?" "Certainly," said Fallon. "When
and where did you study gynecology, Mr. Fallon?"
"Last night in my library," Fallon replied.
A comparatively short time well spent with the
right books and with the expert can give one a
surprising grasp of the most technical subject.
Nearly every concept and process of science
which might be pertinent to a trial can be broken
down into readily understood steps of explanation
and reasoning. The rules of presenting and arguing
expert evidence to a jury are the old basic ones:
Understanding, simplifying, and clarifying. Fre-
quently the experienced forensic expert has worked
out his own methods of making the technical
aspects of his testimony understandable to laymen.
Let him exercise these first on you privately and,
if possible, in the presence of your wife, girl friend,
or grandmother. Whenever anything is not crystal
clear to grandma, stop; then go over the point until
she thoroughly understands it. Then, and only
then, should you feel ready to present it to the
jury.
In the presentation of expert evidence, let the
expert show the jury, whenever possible, that he
can make the findings he says he can. This is most
important when experts are testifying as to identi-
ties. Witnesses such as the handwriting expert who
establishes writing as that of the defendant or the
ballistics expert who establishes that a particular
bullet came from a particular gun are not ex-
pressing an opinion so much as they are giving the
jury facts-facts known to them, but not gen-
erally known, by which they have been able to
establish the connection of one piece of evidence
tc another. These witnesses are experts by reason
of their special knowledge which enables them to
look for and find distinctive characteristics and
points of identity. This usually calls for the use of
magnifiers, microscopes, spectroscopes, etc. When
properly examined they can pass on to the jury
their discoveries and knowledge so that the jurors
themselves arrive at the ultimate opinion. The
argument in such cases is then always less difficult.
To a great extent, you argument will utilize the
expert's simplest explanation as your explanation.
Obviously, different kinds of expert testimony
call for different types of argument and presenta-
tion, each of which could easily be the subject of
an extensive review. However, we might consider
some general observations which are usually ap-
plicable irrespective of the field.
Within the limits of fair advocacy both in pre-
sentation and argument, it is most advisable to
stress and enlarge the training, experience and
qualifications of your expert. Never, of course, fall
into the simple trap set by defense counsel in
offering to stipulate as to qualifications of your
witness. We should look to the expert as an in-
structor who will furnish the jury the required
knowledge which they lack and which will enable
them to decide the issue. Since the jury will accept
the instruction, information, or opinion in direct
proportion to their confidence in his knowledge,
experience, and personal integrity, these factors
should always be fully and fairly presented on voir
dire of your expert. Perhaps you don't have an
expert on that issue. You may be taken by surprise
and the expert may be squarely against your posi-
tion. Many of you have been confronted with this
most dismaying situation and have your own way
of meeting it. If you fail to. cross examine at all,
you risk having the jury conclude that you con-
cede the point. When this happens, it is rather
difficult to handle thii argument. If you do attempt
to cross examine, you will probably flounder help-
lessly and give the expert new chances to drive
home his point. Then you compound your flounder-
ing in argument with conspicuous or specious ex-
planations of the expert's opinion. When presented
with unanswerable evidence in such cases, it is
sometimes better to ignore it, and hope the jury
will, too.
REASONABLE DOUBT
Seldom is the criminal case tried in which de-
fense counsel fails to bear down on reasonable
doubt. The courts in almost all of the states de-
fine this doctrine in the exact language Chief
Justice Shaw used 'in 1850 in the famous Boston
murder case of Commonwealth v. Webster.2 Down
through the years many thousands of words have
been used to tinker with this definition, but it has
2 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711 (1850).
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not been improved upon. Most defense lawyers
pound away with all possible emphasis upon the
burden of proof and reasonable doubt. Some of
them will bear down on the words "moral cer-
tainty" and attempt to suggest to the jury that
these words carry approval of a higher authority
and therefore impose a heavier burden of proof on
the prosecution than mere reasonable doubt. Some
of them single out the word "abiding" and say to
the jury, "Here is the key." They then embellish
this and attempt to build up the required burden of
proof out of all proportion. In effect, they say:
"You jurors can never convict simply because you
conclude that the defendant is probably guilty.
You must be able to say, 'He really is guilty; of
that I am morally certain.'" This instrument of
confusion is utilized by most defense lawyers in
conjunction with their efforts to confuse the jury
as to the evidence or draw attention away from the
evidence.
Prosecutors have very little difficulty with this
situation if the facts are with them. Most of them
avoid referring to the doctrine of reasonable doubt
in their opening argument for two principal rea-
sons: (1) the confusion surrounding the doctrine,
and (2) a desire to avoid focusing undue attention
upon the doctrine and inadvertently helping the
defense lawyer in his argument. Instead they find
it more advantageous to wait until the defense
lawyer has predicated his argument upon the doc-
trine and upon attempts to confuse the evidence.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor may then
answer the attempts of the defense lawyer to con-
fuse the issues and in doing so may review the
highlights of the evidence and thereby gain the
advantage of repeating and emphasizing the evi-
dence.
But how can the prosecutor get the doctrine of
reasonable doubt back in perspective? To start
with, he should acknowledge the fact that the
doctrine is a salutory rule evolved through decades
of judicial experience, and that as an officer of the
court and a lawyer, the prosecutor believes in it
for the protection of not only the one on trial, but
everyone in the nation. The jury should be told in
strong terms that its purpose is to shield the in-
nocent and not to provide a cloak for the guilty.
Reasonable doubt is an actual and sincere mental
hesitation caused by insufficient or unsatisfactory
evidence. Here the "key word", abiding, can be
used to the prosecutor's advantage. It is not a
doubt prompted by sympathy for the defendant,
nor a doubt conjured up in the mind to escape an
unpleasant duty. It is not a doubt that is based
upon the mere fact that there is a conflict in the
evidence, because every juror knows that there will
be a conflict. He should know that the very reason
for the jury is to resolve such conflicts and de-
termine where the truth lies. In short, it is a doubt
where the mind hesitates because reason is not
satisfied. It is not a doubt where the mind is con-
vinced, but hesitates because of the fear of the
consequences in declaring its conclusion; this is not
doubt-this is timidity. This rule of law is an ab-
stract statement of thought and it is most difficult
to express affirmatively. It is questionable whether
or not any amount of style or argument on this
subject could possibly sway the jury unless the
facts themselves warrant it.
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
Obviously, nothing comes up more regularly in
argument than the credibility of witnesses. Let us
consider a few generalities.
Conflicts in testimony are virtually a necessary
incident to the trial of any lawsuit. This ultimately
raises a question of credibility. The attorney who
insists that all his witnesses are persons of im-
peccable truth, honesty and integrity, and all who
differ with their testimony are hopelessly de-
praved and entirely unworthy of belief, doesn't
obtain many favorable verdicts. The brash asser-
tion that a certain witness is a liar or has inten-
tionally falsified is best avoided. If this is obviously
the fact, the attention of the jury need only be
directed to the fact that the witness is not worthy
of belief and the reasons why this is true.
What are some of these reasons why witnesses
are not worthy of belief? Among the most im-
portant of these matters which may be utilized
is the witness's opportunity to observe and his
motivation. The fact that witnesses disagree in
their versions of an occurrence is not by any means
evidence that one or more have intentionally falsi-
fied. The abilities of witnesses to observe and re-
member, the positions from which they viewed the
occurrence, what they happened to be doing at the
time, their emotions before, at the time of, and
after the incident, and all the many other at-
tendant circumstances and factors, must be con-
sidered and weighed. When done carefully and
conscientiously it will often be found that the
supposed discrepancies and conflicts can be logi-
cally accounted for and the true facts arrived at
without questioning the honesty and veracity of
any of the witnesses. As for possible discrepancies
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in the testimony of your own witnesses, it is often
the best practice to review and reconcile these in
your opening argument, thereby taking the teeth
out of your opponent's argument.
In arguing credibility, perhaps the greatest tool
for the prosecutor is a thorough examination of
the witness's motivation. Motivation affords
dramatic contrast between prosecution and de-
fense witnesses. In contrast to most defense wit-
nesses, certainly it can be said that a vast majority
of prosecution witnesses have no personal interest
in the casf, You might point out that they are or-
dinary citizens performing a civic duty and that
they must live with their consciences and would
not rest easy if they identified the wrong man. By
contrast, defense witnesses may have strong moti-
vations which affect their testimony. Obviously
the strongest motivation is that of the defendant
himself. He has the most to lose and it is almost
expected that he will color his testimony to his own
advantage. As for relatives of the defendant, their
bias and interest, or motivations, are strong. Quite
naturally they do not want to believe the worst of
someone in their own family. Sometimes the soft
approach is especially effective with a relative.
For example, when a long-suffering mother of the
defendant testifies on his behalf, you may develop
undue sympathy for her and the defendant if you
attack her vigorously. Instead, it may be much
more effective to gently point out her difficult
situation and her natural deep love and loyalty
that only a mother can possess. You, of course,
have the friends of the defendant to contend with
also. Their motivations are similar to those of rela-
tives, and the same considerations therefore apply.
Quite frequently in the trial of criminal cases you
are confronted with character witnesses. The
danger of such testimony is two-fold: (1) the court
will instruct the jury that character evidence, in
and of itself, may raise a reasonable doubt and
this can hurt the prosecution's case when the jury
is looking for a reason to acquit the defendant; (2)
defense attorneys often argue that by introducing
character evidence it has given the prosecution a
chance to lay before the jury any offenses or ar-
rests suffered by the defendant, and since there
has been no mention of such arrests, the jury can
assume that the defendant not only has a
good reputation but also has a spotless record.
This argument is often countered with the
rather weak approach that this may be the first
time the defendant got caught and, furthermore,
many people, including famous people in history,
had excellent reputations in the communities where
they lived. Basically your approach would prob-
ably be that defendants do not call their enemies
nor disinterested persons, but always friends or
friendly neighbors. Again your emphasis is one of
motivation.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, may I reiterate the following
salient points in effective argument:
(1) Create from the start of the trial an at-
mosphere of sincerity, earnestness, and
confidence in the righteousness of your
cause.
(2) Preparation for argument starts before trial.
(3) Use oratory only when it is the natural and
spontaneous product of the subject matter.
Don't overdo it.
(4) Use simple, forceful, logical terms.
(5) Make your appeal to reason and common
sense.
(6) Be yourself.
THE SOCIAL AND ETHICAL REQUIREMENTS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
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-EDITOR.
Although it seems clear to all of us that it is
socially desirable to prevent all crimes and to ap-
prehend all criminals, there is actually a different
philosophy that prevails, in effect, anyway, with
respect to criminal prosecutions.
Have you ever stopped to c6nsider thoroughly
the real reason why we tolerate so many restric-
tions on the prosecution's efforts to convict and
at the same time give so much leeway to defense
counsel and to the defendant in their efforts to
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avoid a conviction? Perhaps you may be inclined
to say: "Certainly; it's for the protection of the
innocent." This, of course, is one reason-and it is
generally accepted as the only one. But there is
another and a more basic one. Before suggesting it,
however, I would like to raise a few points to in-
dicate, at least to my way of thinking, that the
only or major reason is not the usually stated one
of protection of the innocent.
First of all, why is it that in a criminal prosecu-
tion the defendant-the one person who should be
able to enlighten the fact-finders more than any-
one else--need not take the stand and testify?
Why, in most jurisdictions, is it necessary that
the jury be unanimous in its verdict, when demo-
cratic determinations of utmost importance-
questions of group survival-are made upon the
basis of a two-thirds vote, or even a majority vote
of Congress, Parliament, or of some other body
charged with similar responsibilities?
Why exclude unerring proof of guilt, as about
half of our state courts do, solely because the police
did not follow the prescribed procedures in ob-
taining it?
Why do we who are members of the legal pro-
fession, and why does the public at large, tolerate
a standard of legal ethics that permits defense
counsel to cross-examine, and by cross-examination
"destroy" a prosecution witness when counsel
knows, from what his own client has told him, and
from what his own evidence clearly establishes,
that the prosecution's witness is telling the abso-
lute truth? And upon this point, give consideration
to these words of an eminent and respected defense
counsel; they appeared in an article of his which
was published in a Bar Association journal: "If he
[defense counsel] is defending a guilty person, and
he usually is, his job is to prevent that fact from
coming to light." The article further stated:
"When I succeeded in enabling a malefactor to
escape his just desserts I had a glowing gratifica-
tion of having accomplished a professional tour de
force. This gratification was intensified by the
knowledge that I had lived up to my obligations as
an officer of the court, and had acted in accordance
with the codes of legal ethics."
Why the toleration of a rule that requires the
prosecutor to disclose to the court evidence or
witnesses favorable to the defense, when a similar
obligation does not rest upon counsel for the ac-
cused? And why should the prosecution be re-
quired to make available, for the inspection of
defense counsel, written statements obtained from
the defendant and from the prosecution's wit-
nesses, without placing a comparable obligation
upon defense counsel?
Why not, as a prerequisite to the defense of
alibi, require the defendant to serve notice and
set forth the essential details of the alibi?
Why is it that the defendant may appeal from
a conviction, but (in the United States, anyway)
not the prosecution, and especially in cases where
the judge has grossly erred in his instructions to
the jury or in his rulings upon the evidence? And
why is it that the defendant may appeal on the
ground of improper conduct by the prosecutor,
without according a similar right to the prosecu-
tion when defense counsel has engaged in unethical
or even outrageous conduct that may have affected
the jury verdict?
Why, at the conclusion of a criminal trial, do we
not prosecute for perjury defense witnesses who
have unquestionably lied under oath, and that
fact is readily susceptible of proof? Why let the
defendant himself get by with it? In fact, we are
rather thoroughly committed to the view, tacitly
anyway, that it is all right for him to do just that.
Interestingly enough, one appellate court recently
held that once an accused is acquitted he could
not be tried for perjury regarding his testimony
at the trial because the verdict of not guilty was
res judicala of the issue as to whether he lied or
not. In other words, the verdict of not guilty was
a court decision that he had told the truth. And
yet the case is one where the evidence of perjury
is now obvious beyond a reasonable doubt.
While on the subject of perjury, why, may I
ask, do we not try to convict for perjury, witnesses
who have unquestionably lied during the course of
a divorce trial? Occasionally we do prosecute if the
case is an outrageous frame-up and has been ex-
posed on the front pages of the newspapers, but
otherwise no prosecution is ever undertaken. If it
should be attempted, the chances of a conviction
would be slim. And this last observation prompts
me to raise another question of a little different
nature from the ones previously mentioned.
Why do we tolerate a system or a practice that
makes it so very difficult to convict such accused
persons as paramour killers, mercy killers, and
motorists who kill by reckless driving? And why
do we permit defense counsel in such cases to em-
ploy the tactics they are generally known to em-
ploy for purposes of getting their client off? Recall,
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if you will, the tactics of defense counsel as regards
the insanity defense of the husband in "Anatomy
of Murder."
The true answer to most, if not all, of the ques-
tions I have raised is certainly not--"For the pro-
tection of the innocent."
To get the real answer, what may be needed is to
stretch the mind of the general public out on a
psychoanalyst's couch. If we did that here is what
I believe would be discovered:
11re, the public at large, really do not want to
conwict all criminals, but only enough to discourage
crintinal conduct!
If you will ponder over this statement you will
have to agree, I believe, that the psychoanalyst
came up with a very plausible explanation for the
behavior referred to in my various questions.
Assuming the validity of the couch revelation,
what then may account for the patient's deep-
rooted feelings?
Perhaps we, the public, and particularly the
jury in a specific case, harbor some sort of psycho-
logical self-identification with the offender. In
cases involving paramour killings, mercy killings,
negligent homicides, and the like, this factor may
be more apparent than in various other kinds of
case situations. But in theft cases, also, and par-
ticularly as regards the offense of embezzlement,
we may find the same self-identification factor.
After all-and I submit this to you fully confident
of its validity as to the approximation of per-
centages-about 85 out of every 100 persons will
"steal" if the opportunity to do so is presented to
them. I feel confident that this figure is about right
and I base it upon the professional experiences
some of us have had in the investigation of thefts
and embezzlements committed by employees of
banks, merchandising companies and other com-
mercial houses. To be sure, I am not talking about
large thefts and embezzlements, but thievery
nevertheless. And I include such things as one's
own enrichment by the padding of an expense ac-
count, the carrying home, by an employee, of
merchandise belonging to the store where he works,
and the pocketing of small overages in a bank
teller's account at the end of the day. All this, of
course, is a form of theft. And I wonder if our
propensity for such conduct does not in some meas-
ure explain our laxity with respect to the legal
prosecution of persons accused of thievery.
Before concluding our analysis, perhaps a few
more points are in order.
If I recall correctly, as kids, in playing the game
of "cops and robbers," most of us wanted to be
cops. In college or law school, some students are
attracted by positions in the field of criminal in-
vestigation; a number of them in the United States
pursue a career in the FBI and other such law
enforcement agencies. But how many lav students
express a desire to make a career of prosecuting
attorney? I am not talking, of course, about using
the office of assistant prosecutor as a tide-over or
as preparation for becoming a criminal practi-
tioner on the other side of the table; I am talking
about a burning desire to be a prosecutor, rather
than counsel for the defense. I know, of course,
that there are economic and other factors that
feature in such decision making, but the real reason
must be a more deep-rooted one. It may be this,
by way of differentiation between a desire to be a
criminal investigator and the lesser interest in be-
coming a prosecutor. When the cirninal case
reaches the prosecution stage, the matter becomes
quite personalized. Here stands X, the defendant,
a particular individual, with his sympathy pro-
voking background or situation. Our self-identi-
fication may come much easier and quicker at this
point than when the police were searching for the
unknown someone who committed the crime.
Maybe that is one reason why we tolerate the prac-
tices and the kind of ethical standards that prevail
in a criminal prosecution. That, perhaps, is why
the position of counsel for the defense is more
glamorous in the 'public eye than that of
prosecutor.
It also seems to me that the feeling sometimes
prevails that once an offender has been caught
and has been in police detention and has been sub-,
jected to exposure for what he is, that may be
punishment enough.
Undoubtedly, too, there is the economic factor
of the public not being able to afford to keep in
the penitentiary all the people who may technically
belong there.
From what I have said up until now my readers
may well be assuming that I deplore the philosophy
that we do not want to convict all criminals; that
we want to convict only enough to discourage that
kind of conduct. But I do not. It does not disturb
me at all, and I am prepared to accept that phil-
osophy as a desirable way of life. However, I do
object to the excesses that have developed, like
barnacles on an otherwise good ship. I feel that
the legislatures and the courts, and particularly the
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courts, have gone much too far. And not only is
that fact itself disturbing, but also the reasons for
their doing so.
Here are two case examples of what I mean by
excesses. One is a United States Supreme Court
decision; the other a decision of the British Colum-
bia Supreme Court.
In the very controversial 1957 case of Mallory v.
United States (354 U.S. 449), the trial court
conviction of an accused rapist was reversed solely
because of the fact that the police had interrogated
him and obtained a confession from him at a time
when they were delaying (for a few hours) the
taking of the accused before a committing magis-
trate, as prescribed by a federal rule which re-
quires that the police must do so' "without un-
necessary delay." Soon after the release of the
accused, he committed another offense; and he
was sentenced to sixty days for assaulting the fe-
male complainant. A few months ago he was
prosecuted in Philadelphia on a charge of rape and
burglary, and was found guilty of burglary and
aggravated assault upon a housewife. In my
opinion, the release of persons of this type for the
purpose of disciplining the police is going much too
far.
About the same time of the Mallory case, the
Supreme Court of British Columbia, in the case
of R v. McLean and McKinley (1957) 31 W.W.R.
89, held a confession to a criminal assault upon a
girl to be void because the police interrogator had
made an untrue statement to the defendant when
he was told that the police had talked to the de-
fendant's accomplice, whereas in fact no such
conversation had occurred. Since the officer's
untruthful representation was not the sort, of
thing that might make an innocent person confess,
this decision, in my opinion, is another example of
a court going much too far.
If space permitted, many other similar examples
could be recited, particularly from our federal
courts. But these two are quite illustrative of an
undesirable judicial philosophy that has developed
in recent years.
What accounts for the present "turn 'em loose"
philosophy which the courts have adopted? The
answer, as I see it, is more serious and disturbing
than the individual case decisions themselves.
It has become far too fashionable in judicial
circles to line up "on the liberal side." In their
zeal to become "great judges," the formula of
some judges seems to be: adopt a "turn 'em loose"
policy or count yourself out as a great judge. This
amounts to the writing of one's own epitaph, and
we have had too much of that from some of our
judges in recent years.
Another factor accounting for this "turn 'em
loose" trend of the past fifteen or twenty years is
the failure of the police and prosecution ade-
quately to present to the courts, legislatures and
general public the police-prosecution side of the
issue, whereas the civil liberties viewpoint has
been enthusiastically voiced and effectively pre-
sented. Moreover, the civil liberty lawyers and
other civil liberty exponents are constantly on the
alert for any developments of the police-prosecu-
tion viewpoint; they are always on hand to rush
in and stamp it out if they can.
We urgently need a moderation of the trend
and developments of recent years, and a workable
compromise of the two major competing interests;
and I submit that it ought to be something along
this line:
1. Make reasonably possible-though by no
means certain-that the guilty will be con-
victed.
2. Make certain-insofar as reasonably possible
-that the innocent are not convicted.
This should be the real concern of the courts-
making it reasonably possible to convict the guilty,
and setting up reasonable judicial safeguards for
the protection of the innocent.
The courts have no right to police the police.
That is an executive and not a judicial function.
Furthermore, the courts have enough troubles of
their own. Witness what goes on in some of the
municipal or magistrate courts of our large cities.
In my opinion there are, in such courts, more hurts
to the innocent and more trampling over of basic
individual civil liberties and ethical considerations
than you will find in most police departments.
Much of the concern, energy, and efforts that the
courts expend with respect to police conduct could
be better spent on getting their own house in order.
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